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Currently, only about two in ten German voters 
(20.9 percent) hold populist views. Thus, populism 
is down by about 11.8 percentage points — or by 
just over a third — compared with November 2018 
(32.8 percent). At the end of 2018, about one in three 
voters had a populist attitude, whereas now, this 
figure has fallen to only one in five. The proportion 
of non-populist voters has increased by a similar 
amount. Compared with 31.4 percent at the end of 
2018, almost half of all voters (47.1 percent) have 
now shown themselves to be non-populist in the 
Populism Barometer 2020. Thus, the proportion of 
non-populist voters has even risen by exactly half.
The strength of populist attitudes has also decreased 
considerably, particularly in the political center. The 
counter-mobilization of democratic anti-populism 
was also an anti-populist counter-mobilization of 
the political center. This shows that it is the political 
center, above all, which has turned out to be capable 
of learning from the process of confronting the 
temptations of populism. 
The corona crisis may have stabilized and some-
what reinforced the turnaround in political  
attitudes in Germany. However, the corona effect  
is neither the cause nor the sole driver of this 
change. Already well before the crisis began, a shift 
had been achieved. On the one hand, it was driven  
by significantly improved and more inclusive work 
on the part of the government. On the other hand, 
we are beginning to see the learning effects brought 
about by democratic anti-populism in engaging 
with populists.
At the same time, the remaining populists are 
increasingly becoming a danger, especially on  
the right-wing margins. The first signs of this can  
be seen in their growing tendency to adopt right-
wing extremist attitudes. This applies above all  
to the AfD, which is moving away from the purely 
right-wing populist mobilization movement  
seen in 2016 and 2017, towards a party whose voters 
are increasingly characterized by right-wing 
extremist attitudes.
Populism Barometer 2020
Turnaround in public opinion:  
populist attitudes have become much less pronounced and widespread,  
above all in the political center. As populism declines, populists have been put 
 on the defensive. At the same time, further radicalization on the right is  
becoming a more serious danger.
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What is populism?
Below are various statements on politics and society. For each statement, please indicate the degree to which you agree:
Source: Own items as well as items taken from Hawkins, Kirk, Scott Riding and Cas Mudde (2012). “Measuring Populist Attitudes”. 
The Committee on Concepts and Methods. Working Paper 55. 1–35, and Akkerman, Agnes, Cas Mudde and Andrej Zaslove (2013). 
“How Populist Are the People? Measuring Populist Attitudes in Voters”. Comparative Political Studies. 1–30.
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
mostly disagree strongly disagree
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strongly agree 
POPULIST ATTITUDES
mostly agree
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strongly agree mostly agree
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strongly agree mostly agree
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strongly agree mostly agree
Important questions should not be 
decided by parliament but by popular 
referendums.
The people are often in agreement
but the politicians pursue quite 
different goals.
I would rather be represented by 
a citizen than by a specialized 
politician.
Political parties only want peoples’ 
votes and do not care about their 
opinion.
The politicians in the German 
parliament need to follow the will 
of the people.
The people in Germany agree, on 
principle, about what should happen 
politically.
The political differences between the 
elite and the people are much greater 
than the differences among the people.
What people call “compromise” in 
politics is really just selling out on 
one’s principles.
BRIEF EXPLANATION: Populism as a particular idea of democracy is defined by the distinction between the “true people” 
and “corrupt elites”, the notion of a general will of the people and the idea that society is homogeneous. From this, three 
constitutive dimensions of populism emerge: “anti-establishment”, “pro-popular-sovereignty” and “anti-pluralism”. In these 
three dimensions, it is also possible to measure populist attitudes empirically through surveys: the more strongly voters 
agree with statements and positions corresponding to the three dimensions of populism, the more populist they are. The 
eight items used to identify populism were developed and tested in numerous studies. Today they are largely accepted in 
this form or a similar form as a methodological standard for the comparative measurement of populist attitudes. In order 
to understand populism, it is important to note that none of the three dimensions is enough on its own to identify populist 
attitudes. All three dimensions are necessary conditions for populism and have to be fulfilled simultaneously. The same also 
goes for the eight items: only when they all interact with each other at the same time do individual statements become an 
overall populist understanding of democracy and politics. Therefore, for our Populism Barometer, only someone who either 
“strongly” or “mostly” agrees with all eight statements counts as “populist”. Respondents who “strongly disagree” with at 
least one statement, or who “mostly disagree” with at least half of the eight statements, are described as being non-populist. 
All other respondents are neither populist nor non-populist, and fall into the category of “mixed.”
Source:
All figures, illustrations and analyses in this Policy Brief are based on the results of the "Populismusbarometer 2020": Vehrkamp, Robert, and  
Wolfgang Merkel (2020). Populismusbarometer 2020 - Populistische Einstellungen bei Wählern und Nichtwählern in Deutschland 2020. Gütersloh. 
DOI 10.11586/2020044. The Populism Barometer 2020 explores the findings of several online surveys conducted between May 2017 and June 2020, 
which were carried out by infratest dimap and YouGov Germany. In the most recent survey from June 2020, a total of 10,055 people were interviewed. 
The results presented are representative for the German population aged 18 and over. This Policy Brief corresponds to the "Executive Summary" of the 
study “Populismusbarometer 2020” cited above.
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Turnaround in public opinion:  
a sharp decline in populist attitudes
In the year of the 2017 federal elections and the year 
afterwards, populist attitudes were widespread among 
German voters. In 2017, around three in ten voters 
held populist views. In fact, in the year after the federal 
elections, their populism became even stronger and 
more prevalent (Vehrkamp and Merkel 2018).
Currently, only about two in ten people in the German 
electorate (20.9 percent) hold populist views. That is 
11.8 percentage points or slightly over a third less than 
in November 2018 (32.8 percent). Or to put it differently: 
while every third voter had a populist attitude at the 
end of 2018, now it is only every fifth.  
The proportion of non-populist voters has risen  
to a similar degree. Compa red with 31.4 percent at the 
end of 2018, almost half of all voters (47.1 percent) 
have now shown themselves to be non-populist  
in the Populism Barometer 2020. Thus, the proportion 
of non-populist voters has even risen by exactly  
a half. 
At the same time, the group of “mixed” (partly popu-
list) voters has decreased by 3.8 percentage points to 
32 percent. This reinforces the clarity of the trend. The 
decline in populist attitudes has not simply coincided 
with a similarly significant increase in “mixed” atti- 
tudes among voters. On the contrary: the increase 
in the proportion of non-populist voters was even 
noticeably greater than the decrease in the proportion 
of populist voters.
But there has not only been a sharp decrease in the 
proportion of populist voters. Populist attitudes have 
themselves also become much less pronounced.  
In comparison with the situation at the end of 2018,  
the tendency towards populism on average across the 
electorate on the populist scale from 0 (non-populist) 
to 8 (populist) has sunk by 0.68 scale points to 4.66. 
That is by far the lowest level since the first surveys 
carried out for the Populism Barometer in spring 2017. 
Here, too, we can see that populists in Germany are 
once again on the defensive. 
Not only corona: populism on the defensive
The turnaround in public opinion is certainly also an 
effect of increased approval ratings for politics and the 
government in the course of the corona crisis so far. 
But by no means exclusively. An anti-populist shift in 
public opinion had already been achieved in 2019,  
and was then stabilized and reinforced by the  
corona crisis. 
This can also be seen when we trace the level of  
populism over time. On the one hand, the five data 
points in the Populism Barometer between March 2017 
and June 2020 show the populist tendency of public 
opinion before and after the 2017 federal elections: 
while the proportion of voters with populist views rose 
from 29.2 percent in March 2017 to almost a third  
(32.8 percent) in November 2018, over the same period 
the proportion of non-populist voters sank from  
36.9 percent to only 31.4 percent.  
 
The populist wave in Germany reached its highest 
point so far at the end of 2018. By the end of 2019,  
the proportion of populists was already much lower 
and the proportion of non-populists was signifi- 
cantly higher than in the run-up to the 2017 federal  
elections. The turnaround had taken place, and  
Change since 2018
-11.8
-3.8
+15.7
mixed 
non-populist 
populist
How populist are the Germans?
As a percentage of all respondents
non-populist
mixed
populist
20.9
(-11.8)
47.1
(+15.7)
32.0
(-3.8)
Changes since November 2018 in brackets
Target population: German population aged 18 and over (sample size 2020: 10,055).
Source: infratest dimap and YouGov 
on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
“The Corona crisis may have stabilized and 
reinforced the turnaround in public opinion, but 
it did not cause it.”
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The decline of populism in the political center
This is particularly noteworthy because in recent years, 
the political center has often — and with reason — 
been described as democratically unstable, fragile 
and certainly not resistant enough to the temptations 
of populism and extremism. This was also a central 
finding of the Populism Barometer 2018, which  
pointed to the “increasing populism of the political  
center”. At that time, no other segment of the  
German electorate showed such a marked increase  
in populism as the political center. In particular,  
the right-wing populist AfD had succeeded in  
mobilizing the political center with its extreme brand 
of populism.
Against this background, it is important that the 
anti-populist shift is also being supported and driven 
particularly by the political center. This segment of  
the electorate is now much more resilient and resistant 
to populism than it was in the context of the 2017 
federal elections. At any rate, democratic anti-popu-
lism and the anti-populist mobilization are currently 
being sustained and pushed forward from the political 
center of the electorate.
The proportion of non-populists in the political center 
of the electorate has risen by almost two thirds,  
from only 27 percent in May 2018 to 44 percent today. 
At the same time, the proportion of populists in  
the political center has declined from 34 percent to  
23 percent. The sharp rise in the proportion of 
non-populists is particularly striking: their share  
in the political center rose much more steeply  
than it did across the electorate on average. While 
non-populism rose on average by 50 percent across 
the whole electorate, it rose by around 70 percent  
in the political center.
This shows that the political center is in fact parti- 
cularly capable of learning from the past, taking  
action and resisting populist temptations. Public 
opinion is cooling towards populism, and the political 
center is proving to be a stabilizer and driver in  
this shift.
the new trend continued as the corona crisis arrived  
in March 2020.
Whether the trend would have continued to be  
reinforced even without the crisis must remain a 
matter for speculation. The onset, development  
and political management of the crisis certainly have 
strengthened and reinforced the trend. The “return  
of trust” (Vehrkamp and Bischoff 2020) in good,  
reliable and inclusive government action has also  
put the populists on the defensive. However,  
when it comes to learning from previous years and 
engaging politically with populists, it is important 
to note that the corona crisis was not the triggering 
factor.
Thus, democratic anti-populism does not necessarily 
need a “big crisis”, but can also succeed as a process 
of democratic self-assertion within everyday politics. 
2019 was a good example of this. Liberal democracy 
responded to populist mobilization with a  
democratic counter-mobilization — also and  
especially in the political center. Thus, the  
counter-mobilization of democratic anti-populism 
was also an anti-populist counter-movement from 
the political center.
Populism on the defensive
Change in percentage compared with November 2018
Target population: German population aged 18 and over (sample size 2020: 10,055).
Source: infratest dimap and YouGov 
on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
As a percentage of all respondents
-36 %
2018
2020
32.8 20.9
2020
2018
+50 %31.4 47.1
How the populist electorate has changed since 2018
How the non-populist electorate has changed since 2018
“It is precisely the political center that has shown 
itself capable of learning from the populist 
temptation.”
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Much more resistant to populism:  
the party system before the 2021 federal elections
Analyzing the voters of each party in the political  
center leads to the same conclusion. Their populism 
has decreased sharply in strength and prevalence. 
Thus, for the moment, the CDU/CSU and the FDP  
have been prevented from sliding further into the 
populist voter segment. The CDU/CSU and FDP are 
therefore once again firmly anchored in the non- 
populist voter segment slightly to the right of the 
political center.
For the first time since 2017, the overall picture of  
all parties shows that the five parties slightly to the 
left and right of the political center (CDU/CSU, the 
Greens, SPD and FPD) are all clearly below average  
in their level of populism. This non-populist bloc  
of established parties in the political center currently 
represents just over 80 percent of all voters.  
The populism of the political margins is also much less 
pronounced than it was in 2017/2018.
One of the most important results of the Populism 
Barometer 2018 was the creeping increase in populist 
attitudes in the traditional center. Voters of the  
CDU/CSU and FDP had shown themselves to be signi-
ficantly more populist than in the election year 2017. 
This development has corrected itself again in the 
year before the 2021 federal elections: in the Populism 
Barometer 2020, voters in the traditional center were 
actually less populist than in the election year 2017.  
It seems that for the time being, their excursion into 
the realms of populism is over. 
The temptation of the CDU/CSU and the FDP to follow, 
imitate or at least rhetorically adapt to the populism of 
the AfD has been recognized as a mistake and corrected.
Significant changes since 2018 are represented by arrows.
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Party voters by populism and left-right orientation
Note: Points indicate average for each party’s voters; dashed red lines indicate average of all eligible voters in 2020.
Target population: German electorate aged 18 and over (sample size 2020: 7,924).
Source: infratest dimap and YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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interesting. How right-wing extremist are the voters 
of the AfD?
A clear majority (56 percent) of all AfD voters hold 
either latently right-wing extremist (27 percent) or even 
manifestly right-wing extremist attitudes (38 percent).  
At the same time, 73 percent of all AfD voters are either 
clearly populist (38 percent) or at least partly popu- 
list (35 percent). The proportion of AfD voters who are 
both non-populist and also not right-wing extremist  
is only 13 percent. Thus, almost nine out of ten AfD 
voters (87 percent) hold either very clearly or at least 
latently populist and/or right-wing extremist views.
In summary, the AfD has a unique selling point in  
the German Bundestag, not only as a right-wing 
populist mobilization movement, but also as a party 
whose voters are characterized by at least implicitly 
right-wing extremist attitudes. And the more  
populism dies down and populist voters from the 
center return to the mainstream parties, the  
more dominant right-wing extremist attitudes are  
becoming among AfD voters.
No alternative for Germany
It is also particularly striking that the enormously 
high rejection rates of the AfD have not improved at all 
since it entered the German Bundestag. With a rejec-
tion rate of 71 percent among all German voters, its 
negative party identity is almost at the same level as in 
March 2017. Six months later, it succeeded in entering 
the Bundestag for the first time in the 2017 federal 
elections. Still, establishing its presence in parliament 
did not allow the AfD to improve its rejection rate. 
More than seven in ten German voters still have a 
“very low” opinion of the AfD, and would therefore be 
very unlikely to vote for the party in the near future. 
This picture has shifted for Die Linke: in March 2017, 
its rejection rate was still at 51 percent, but it has now 
managed to reduce this to around 40 percent. In June 
2020, it was therefore roughly on a par with the FDP.
At the end of 2018, the FDP was still in a very narrow 
range with the SPD, the Greens and the CDU/CSU, with 
Voters in the left-liberal center had already largely 
escaped the populist dynamic of public opinion  
in Germany before and after the 2017 federal elections. 
In 2020, Green voters will remain the least populist  
of all in Germany, and the SPD’s scale figures  
even show a slightly above-average decrease in the 
degree of populism of its voters. The voters of  
Die Linke are also currently less left-wing and are  
now less populist too. This means that they  
have moved closer to the positions of the SPD and  
the Greens.
Thus, the party landscape in Germany is much more 
resistant to populism in the year before the 2021 federal 
elections than it was before and after the 2017 elections. 
AfD: increasing dominance of right-wing  
extremist attitudes 
The AfD remains an extreme outlier in the German 
party landscape of 2020. It continues to occupy a 
position in the right-wing populist segment of the 
electorate which, in terms of populist attitudes and 
ideological orientation, is by far the furthest removed 
from all other parties and from the average of all 
eligible voters. With a score of 5.9 for populism and 6.5 
for right-wing orientation, the AfD has even boosted  
its unique selling point as an extreme right-wing 
populist party.
For this reason alone, a closer look at the extent, 
degree and radicalism of its right-wing attitudes is 
73 %
13 %
56 %
Populism and right-wing extremist views among AfD voters
Target population: AfD voters (sample size: 1,115).
Source: YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
As a percentage of all AfD voters
AfD voters with 
non-populist, 
non-right-wing 
extremist views
AfD voters 
with populist 
or partially 
populist views AfD voters with latently 
or manifestly right-wing 
extremist views
“A clear majority of all AfD voters hold  
either latently or even manifestly right-wing 
extremist views.”
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around 30 percent rejection across all voters. Since then, 
its rejection rates have risen by a third to 40 percent, 
which is probably due above all to the way in which the 
party behaved after the state elections in Thuringia.
The parties of the Grand Coalition have had a different 
fate: they were only recently able to improve their 
ratings somewhat as part of their management of the 
corona pandemic. 
In any case, the extremely low and stable “glass 
ceiling” for the AfD remains a key feature of negative 
party identities in Germany.
"More direct democracy" as an opportunity  
for mobilization
For anyone seeking an issue which appeals to populists 
and non-populists alike and could mobilize both 
groups, “more direct democracy” is the most promis- 
ing choice — also in the upcoming federal election 
campaign in 2021.
Across the voters of all parties, high approval ratings 
for more direct democracy show that this is a topic 
with broad appeal. Within a range of nine to 19 
percentage points, the ratings for all individual parties 
are somewhere between the values for non-populists 
and populists, and are at least just under a third  
more than the value for non-populists.
Although there are clear differences between the par-
ties here, the issue of “more direct democracy” offers 
all parties the opportunity to gain approval and  
mobilize voters. Across the electorate, there is the  
greatest possible coalition for “more direct 
democracy”. This suggests that all parties could take 
advantage of this in the coming federal  
election campaign in 2021.
Negative party identities over time
Note: Percentage of respondents who stated that they had a “very low” opinion of a particular party.
Target population: German population aged 18 and over (sample size 2020: 10,055).
Source: infratest dimap and YouGov on behalf of the Bertelsmann Stiftung.
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“The issue of “more direct democracy” offers 
all parties the opportunity to gain approval and 
mobilize voters.”
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This has been reinforced by its crisis management in 
the corona pandemic, which has been well-received by 
many people so far. Although it was late to the point of 
negligence, the anti-populist reaction from the parties 
in the political center has also had an effect. The public 
and media debate on populism has improved. The effect 
of this would be even greater if there were less arrogance 
and cosmopolitan self-importance involved. 
Moreover, the decline of populism in the center is re- 
ducing the mobilization potential of right-wing 
populism and leaving behind an increasingly right-wing 
extremist AfD. The right-wing populist mobilization 
movement of 2017/18 is becoming a party whose voters 
are increasingly characterized by right-wing extremist 
attitudes. The rise of right-wing populism has been 
pushed back for the time being. There are many indi- 
cations that the trend is reversing.
However, it is still far too early to draw a final conclu-
sion. The populist wave in Germany may have broken, 
but it has not yet ebbed away entirely. In other countries, 
it is leaving behind democracies permanently damaged 
by authoritarianism, even in Europe. And the populist 
temptation remains a latent presence in Germany too.
Turnaround: a sharp decline in populist attitudes
At the end of 2018, we warned at this point against the 
further rise in populism. The populist dynamic of public 
opinion had reached its peak. As we said at the time, 
populism in democracies is always a symptom. It is 
never successful without reason. Successful anti- 
populism means finding new solutions, building bridges, 
overcoming emerging lines of division, closing gaps in 
representation and reducing responsiveness deficits 
(Vehrkamp and Merkel 2018).
Has this been achieved? Does the decline of populism in 
Germany show that democratic anti-populism works? 
Are we seeing the effects of an assertive, self-critical 
approach to democracy?
At least partly: once the government crises of 2017/18 
were overcome, a more inclusive and socially responsive 
form of governance did show results. The Grand 
Coalition’s restrictive migration policy has weakened 
the mobilizing power of the migration and refugee 
issue. The Coalition had earned itself a bad reputation, 
but since early 2019 it has been working better. 
Socio-economic issues are coming more to the fore. 
A Policy Brief of the Bertelsmann Stiftung
The policy brief of the Bertelsmann Stiftung’s  
“Future of Democracy” program deals with current  
topics and challenges related to democracy. It concentrates  
on the issues of political participation, the future of parties  
and parliaments, the sustainability of democratic politics as 
well as new forms of direct democracy and citizens’  
participation. It is published 6-8 times per year on an  
unfixed basis.
Legally responsible for content 
Bertelsmann Stiftung · Carl-Bertelsmann-Strasse 256 
D-33311 Gütersloh · www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Dr. Robert Vehrkamp, Christina Tillmann
Editorial assistance and inquiries: 
gaelle.beckmann@bertelsmann-stiftung.de 
Tel. +49 5241 81 81105
September 2020 | ISSN: 2198 – 9796
Further reading:
Merkel, Wolfgang, and Felix Scholl (2018). "Illiberalism, Populism 
and Democracy in East and West". Czech Journal of Political Science 
25 (1). 28–44.
Merkel, Wolfgang, and Robert Vehrkamp (2018). “Die populistische 
Versuchung”. Der Tagesspiegel. 14.10.2018. https://www.tagesspiegel.
de/politik/populismus-der-verkleidete-nationalismus-und-die-ausgeh
oehltedemokratie/23183964-2.html?inMaxCount=3.
Vehrkamp, Robert, and Wolfgang Merkel (2018). Populism 
Barometer 2018. Populist Attitudes of Voters and Non-Voters in 
Germany 2018. Study by the Bertelsmann Stiftung and the Berlin 
Social Science Center (WZB).
Vehrkamp, Robert, and Lars Bischoff (2020). A Return of Trust? 
EINWURF – Policy Brief by the Bertelsmann Stiftung (1). 1–8. 
Authors:
 
Dr. Robert Vehrkamp
robert.vehrkamp@bertelsmann-stiftung.de
Tel. +49 5241 81 81526
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Merkel
wolfgang.merkel@wzb.eu
Tel. +49 30 25491 330
Dr. Robert Vehrkamp is Senior Advisor in the Bertelsmann Stiftung‘s
Future of Democracy program and was a visiting scholar in the
Department of “Democracy and Democratization” at the Berlin 
Social Science Center (WZB).
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Merkel is Director emeritus of the department 
"Democracy and Democratization" at the Berlin Social Science 
Center (WZB) and Professor emeritus of Political Science at the 
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Department of Social Sciences.
